THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: The West's Bridge to the Islamic World?

by Andrew Patterson

As a developing country, Turkey has a fairly unique political history, especially for a country in the Middle East. Most Islamic countries in the Middle East are known for being heavily fundamentalist, theocratic, traditionalist and anti-West. However, the modern Republic of Turkey is a stark contrast to many of its neighbors. Previously ruled for over 600 years by the Ottoman Empire, the Turkey the world recognizes today began in 1923 when political leader Mustafa Kemal, later known as Ataturk, abolished the Ottoman Empire and installed new forms of government. Since then the country has gone through a vast array of changes with steady success but with its fair share of problems (McNamara, 2009, para. 2-4). Ultimately, however, what stands out about modern Turkey is that it is remarkably secular and modernized. Additionally, Turkey’s modern day political system features an executive, legislative and judicial branch. It has a constitution and it is considered a republican parliamentary democracy. This is a similar structure to the United States’ government, though Turkey’s legal system takes more influence from Europe (CIA, 2013). This begs the question then – should Turkey serve as model for other developing Islamic countries in the Middle East? Is Turkey the bridge, if you will, that the West needs to reach the Islamic world? To help answer these questions, one should examine the Republic of Turkey’s use of forced secularization and modernization through autocratic rule, how it affected women, and how it ultimately enacted a slow, gradual transition to democracy.

Initially, once the Republic of Turkey was formed in 1923, Ataturk became an autocratic ruler of the country (Handleman, 2011, p. 109). Ataturk’s biggest political change from the previous Ottoman Empire was initiating an immediate separation of church and state (Handleman, 2011, p. 109). Ataturk removed the rule of the caliphate (Turkey’s supreme religious leader) and the Islamic courts (Cagaptay, 2007, p.7). In addition, Ataturk also went beyond mere secularization of government by also instituting forced secularization of Turkish society. For example, “the government westernized the alphabet, clothing and nation’s legal code” while also restricting religious political groups for running for office (Handleman, 2011, p. 109-110).  By 1928 Islam was not even declared as Turkey’s official state religion (Cagaptay, 2007, p.7).

              According to author Soner Cagaptay, Turkey’s secularism differs from the United States’ form of secularism, and it is more modeled after Europe (2007, p.8). Cagaptay described this, writing, “Unlike American secularism, which has historically provided ‘freedom of religion’ to and for people fleeing religious persecution, European (French and Turkish) secularism (laicite), born in reaction to the domination of the political sphere by one faith, has promoted ‘freedom from religion’” (2007, p.8). This form of secularism created a “firewall between religion and politics” (Cagaptay, 2007, p.8). Author Yesim Arat expanded further on this, writing: “The secularism of the Republican state [of Turkey] has traditionally meant not merely the separation of religion and state but also state control over religion. Imbued with the conviction that the state represents the best interests of the people despite the people, the Kemalist reformers have aimed to confine religion to the private realm” (1998, p. 123).

            This drastic and autocratic forced secularization of Turkey’s government and society is perhaps the biggest thing that makes Turkey unique among developing Muslim nations in the Middle East. Typically a major source of oppression for Muslims in the Middle East has originated from theocratic government policies, such as the theocratic monarchy in Saudi Arabia or the ruthless Taliban in Afghanistan. In Turkey, on the other hand, Muslims arguably received oppression from a secular, autocratic government. While “urban middle class” citizens tend to support this secularization and modernization, citizens from rural areas have often opposed it (Handleman, 2011, p. 110).

            This issue is made even more complex and intriguing when one examines women’s rights in Turkey since the secular reforms of Ataturk. On the one hand, one can make the case that women’s rights have greatly increased. For instance, women were given voting rights after not having them previously under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to this, however, Ataturk’s secular reforms have also arguably oppressed women in other ways; most notably, by banning the wearing of headscarves in public. Because of this, any woman that wants to attend university or work for the government cannot wear headscarves. However, by removing their headscarves women would also be going against their religion (Handleman, 2011, p. 109-110). The result of this government policy continues to marginalize women in Turkey instead of empowering them. Furthermore, although the policy is secular in nature, it also ends up persecuting citizens because of their religion. Additionally, although these reforms were designed to empower women, the standards for how women should dress and act were still being created by men; most notably, the standard set by Ataturk and the state (White, 2003, p.145). Author Jenny White described this, writing, “The Republican state determined the characteristics of the ideal woman and set up a monopolistic  system to propagate this ideal in a population that held often quite different values and perceptions of ideal women’s behavior” (2003, p. 145). Again, here lies an inherent contradiction of the secular reforms. The state simultaneously works to empower women, but it is dictated on the state’s terms, so any misgivings from the female population are suppressed.

Ataturk

Despite this, the autocratic nature of these secular reforms perhaps had a similar effect as autocratic economic reforms in other developing nations (though the key in all of these autocratic reforms is that power always needs to be eventually given up).To explain, although some women’s rights were suppressed temporarily by these reforms – a short term cost in rebuilding the structure of a society -- in the long run women’s rights and opportunities increased because of them. In addition to voting and civil rights, women were open up to educational, economic and political opportunities and power (White, 2003, p. 150-151). Author Jenny White even went as far to praise Turkey’s reforms as breakthrough for women across the world, writing, “The state feminist model … despite its authoritarian rigidity about what constitutes a modern woman, was groundbreaking and successful in allowing Turkish women to participate in society at all levels to an extent that unheard of in Europe or the United States at the time” (2003, p. 158).

            Furthermore, over time Turkey has become increasingly democratic.  Despite his initial autocratic rule, a major part of Ataturk’s plan for Turkey involved democracy (Cagaptay, 2007, p. 8). The only caveat to this was that Ataturk demanded Turkey to achieve secularism prior to achieving democracy (Cagaptay, 2007, p. 9). Author Yasim Arat expanded on this, writing: “A solidarist collectivist ethic served as a tool for modernizing reforms when appeals to individualism could not be effective as a means to [secularization and democratization]. … Interests of the community and the nation would come before the interests of the individual” (1998, p. 118). However, starting in the 1950s the government began allowing participation of religious political groups into politics, although at first they received heavy opposition and even suppression from secular government forces (Handleman, 2011, p. 110). Because of this, progress for religious political groups was slow, but in 2002 the religious political group known as AK was victorious in the 2002 national election (Handleman, p.110).

            Perhaps in the long run forced secularization and westernization through autocratic rule was what Turkey needed. In a region where religion and government have been so intrinsically linked – and where civil rights and educational, technological and economic progress has been suppressed in the name of religion – perhaps forced secularization was the essential first step in advancing Turkey as a freer society. This returns to the notion of a painful short term cost, but with eventual rewards in the long run. The key for Turkey, however, has been its slow, gradual transition from autocratic rule to democracy. For example, there have been three military coups since the government has started to have open elections in the 1950s (Lewis, 1994, para. 20). In fact, the Turkish military is strictly dedicated to preserving the constitution and by extension the continuing secularization of Turkey (Cagaptay, 2007, p. 9). However, according to author Bernard Lewis, Turkey’s history of military interventions is unique, writing, “What is remarkable is not that these interventions took place--that is, after all, the norm in that region and political culture--but that after all three, the military withdrew to its barracks, and allowed, even facilitated, the resumption of the democratic process” (Lewis, 1994, para. 20). Again, this highlights a gradual, if not occasionally painful transition.  

Compare Turkey then to countries in the Arab Spring, who through revolution launched their countries from autocratic rule straight into democracy.  While the Arab democratic uprising was initially endorsed by many, there is now arguably some serious worry in the West over the stability and legitimacy of the democracies in some of the countries where revolution took place. In Egypt, for instance, the religious political group the Muslim Brotherhood has risen as the major party of power, but unlike the AK in Turkey there is not a secularist military to keep the Muslim Brotherhood in check. The question then is will there be continuing protection of religious and civil liberties in Egypt for minority groups and women?  Furthermore, countries in the Arab Spring might want democracy, but do they actually want full secularization, westernization and all that it has to offer (Bloomberg, 2012, para. 26)? Is democracy out of sudden revolution sustainable? Author Bernard Lewis further explained the success of Turkey’s gradual transition to democracy, writing:

“Specifically, the Turkish experiment in parliamentary democracy has been going on for a century and a quarter--much longer than in any other country in the Islamic world--and its present progress therefore rests on a far stronger, wider, and deeper base of experience. The vicissitudes of democracy under the late Ottomans, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and under his successors would seem to confirm the belief that democracy is a strong medicine, which must be administered in small and only gradually increased doses. Too large and too sudden a dose can kill the patient” (1994, para. 27).

            With this in mind, it is perhaps impossible to fully secularize nations in the Middle East. For better or worse, Islam is tied very closely to government and politics.  Despite many Muslims wanting democracy and modernization, there is still an apparent desire to keep religion and politics linked. This is also illustrated in Turkey with the election of the religious AK party. Even in the United States, which is deemed secular and representative of Western culture, there has never been a President that has not been Christian. In fact, there was controversy over President John F. Kennedy being Catholic, with Republican 2012 presidential nominee Mitt Romney being Mormon, and then the ridiculous (and bigoted) rumors of President Barack Obama being Muslim. The point is that, whether from the Middle East or the West, people often wish to bring their religious values into politics, because it is – again, for better or worse – arguably what gives nations a considerable part of their identity.

Furthermore, arguably what has made the West and Turkey successful as democracies (despite their shortcomings) is their prioritizing of secularism and safe-guarding against theocratic upheavals. Turkey’s use of forced-secularization and modernization through autocratic rule has allowed for gradual transition to democracy. As evidenced by the formation of the religious political group the AK, religion may never be able to be taken entirely out of Turkish or Middle Eastern politics – just like it may never be taken directly out of the United States’ politics – but if there is enough safeguards of secularism intact (even if it suppresses the wishes of people), then society has a better chance to prosper, making Turkey a fine model for developing countries in the Middle East.

Works Cited

Arat, Yesim. (1998). Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkey. Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 117-131.  Published by: International Society of Political Psychology. Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792117

Cagaptay, Soner. (2007). Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey: New Elections, Troubling Trends. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. P. 1-32. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus67.pdf

CIA World Factbook. Turkey: Government section. Last Updated: 29 March, 2013. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html

Gaouette, Nicole. (2012). ‘Arab Spring’ stirs U.S. Worries After Year of Turmoil. Bloomberg. Retrieved from:  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-13/arab-spring-s-enthusiasm-gives-way-to-continuing-crisis-for-u-s-allies.html

Handleman, Howard. (2011). “Religion and Politics.” The Challenge of Third World Development. Pearson Prentice Hall. Special Edition for Penn State 2011. P. 109-110.

Lewis, Bernard. (1994). Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy. Middle East Quarterly. P. 41-49. Retrieved from: http://www.meforum.org/216/why-turkey-is-the-only-muslim-democracy

McNamara, Melissa. (2009). History of Turkey. CBS News. Retrieved from: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-2213120.html

White, Jenny B. (2003). State Feminism, Modernization, and the Turkish Republican Woman. NWSA Journal , Vol. 15, No. 3, Gender and Modernism between the Wars, 1918-1939, p. 145-159. Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4317014